Immanuel Quickley
Paying a premium — −$5.0M under water
Immanuel Quickley projects to 7.9 marginal wins — $27.5M of on-court value — against an apron-adjusted true cost of $32.5M.
Paying a premium — −$5.0M under water
The verdict swings from −$12.9M (bear) to +$4.1M (bull) — too assumption-sensitive to move on; let another season of data settle the call.
For $32.5M this season (3 yr, $105M total), you are buying 7.9 marginal wins of EPM production — $27.5M of value at $3.5M/win. Against an apron-adjusted true cost of $32.5M, that nets −$5.0M of surplus, 80th of 178 tracked contracts — it grades as an overpay.
If wins price up toward $4.2M/win and the apron tax eases, production value climbs to $36.6M and surplus swings to +$4.1M — fair value in the optimistic case.
If a marginal win is worth less and the apron bites harder, true cost rises to $32.5M and surplus falls to −$12.9M — an overpay in the pessimistic case; the verdict flips across the band.
Caution — the verdict flips somewhere across bear/base/bull assumptions. This call is assumption-sensitive, not settled.
This call changes under bear assumptions: Immanuel Quickley grades Paying a premium in the bear case but Fairly pricedin the bull case — treat the verdict above as a live read of today’s sliders, not a settled fact.
The market's own numbers: a win costs what the middle of the league pays for it.
Every apron dollar is real money — the tax ledger, not the highlight reel, decides who wins the summer.
Banners hang forever. A marginal win today is worth almost any tomorrow, and the tax is the cost of doing business.
Wins you buy before you're ready are the most expensive wins in basketball — flexibility is the only asset that never ages.
The tenth man is closer to the star than the star's agent admits — pay for scarcity you can prove, not reputation.
3 of 5 desks disagree with the verdict above — that disagreement is the story.
Take the question to the docket →Similar money band ($32.4M vs $32.5M) and impact (2.5 vs 2.6); his deal grades paying a premium at −$5.5M.
Similar money band ($32.0M vs $32.5M) and impact (2.5 vs 2.6); his deal grades albatross risk at −$37.1M.
Similar money band ($32.0M vs $32.5M) and impact (2.5 vs 2.6); his deal grades paying a premium at −$5.1M.
How the model gets there.
The audit trail behind every figure in the memo above — six steps from raw on-court impact to the final surplus verdict, using the same sliders. Drag any assumption and the memo above updates with it.
AASV = wins × $/win − cap hit × apron multiplier. Set the knobs to your own front-office judgment — every number on this page updates live.
League estimated net rating (per 100 poss. vs. an average player), cached from stats.nba.com (seed snapshot).
Est. Impact = 2.6 · 2025-26 · 72 games · 2,500 minutes
Impact is credited above replacement level (-2.0), scaled by the possessions he actually played (minutes × 2.08/min), then converted at 30.5 net points per win.
(2.6 − (-2.0)) × 5,208 poss ÷ 100 = 240 net pts
240 ÷ 30.5 = 7.9 wins
Wins are priced at your $/win setting ($3.5M per win).
7.9 wins × $3.5M = $27.5M
TOR is a below apron team, so every Immanuel Quickley dollar is charged at 1.00× — your setting for what that tier’s tax and roster restrictions really cost. Contract: 3 yrs · $105M remaining.
$32.5M cap hit × 1.00 = $32.5M
$27.5M − $32.5M = −$5.0M
Immanuel Quickley costs more than he produces under these assumptions — the contract eats value.
First season on file — the trend view, and its tie-in to aging risk, unlocks once another season lands.